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Abstract 
The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) and the unclassified version of the 
U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) both focus on China and Russia as preeminent 
challenges for the United States. The NDS states specifically, “Long-term strategic 
competitions with China and Russia are the principal priorities for the Department [of 
Defense].”1 This paper focuses on the strategic challenges that these two nations pose and 
provides recommendations for U.S. strategy and policy. Globalization and the rapid 
advancement of technology has changed the utility of force in the 21st century. The utility 
of force has evolved, resulting in a shift in the character of war. This shift entails an 
increased focus on methods of force mainly below the threshold of traditional armed 
great power conflict. In order to preserve a stable international order, the U.S. needs 
strategies and polices that adapt to the new threat environment. In particular the United 
States should: (1) Concurrently build defensive capabilities and adopt a strong and public 
policy of deterrence to counter current and emerging hybrid, gray-zone, and advanced 
technological threats. (2) Renew dedication to longer-term interests and favor negotiated 
solutions—including pursuing norms and agreements on emerging conflict-relevant 
technologies—to counter the growing risk of miscalculation and escalation from gray-
zone provocations (most notably in the cyber domain). (3) Increase domestic resilience 
 





by strengthening the electoral system, building stronger public-private partnerships, and 
working with the international community to increase attribution in the cyber domain. (4)  
Ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and provide additional 
funding for initiatives in the Indo-Pacific. (5) Strongly defend the status quo with Taiwan 
and in the South China Sea but, after increasing U.S. strategic involvement in the region, 
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 U.S. national interests and priorities can and will evolve, especially with changing 
administrations. In the 2017 U.S. National Security Strategy, the Trump Administration 
laid out the nation’s four vital national interests, called the “four pillars”: Protect the 
homeland, the American people, and the American way of life; promote American 
prosperity; preserve peace through strength; and advance American influence.2 Since the 
Cold War, the United States has also traditionally viewed a strong North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO), strong U.S. led liberal institutions worldwide, and flourishing 
democratic governance as being vital to the interests of the United States. All of these 
interests must be considered when building a strategy. 
Long-term strategic competitions with China and Russia are the principal 
priorities for the Department, and require both increased and sustained 
investment, because of the magnitude of the threats they pose to U.S. security and 
prosperity today, and the potential for those threats to increase in the future.3 – 
Unclassified Summary of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy 
 
The 21st century, has been marked by an evolving and increasingly complex threat 
environment. According to the 2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community, “[t]he risk of interstate conflict, including among great powers, 
 
2 United States, The White House. (2017, December). National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America. Retrieved April 16, 2019, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
 





is higher than at any time since the end of the Cold War.”4 Although the risk of conflict is 
increasing, the environment in which conflict occurs is heavily impacted by nuclear 
weapons, escalation management, and a rapidly evolving technological environment. 
These factors have led nations to significantly limit and change their use of force; while 
there is no shortage of conflict globally, the forms that conflict has taken have shifted to 
more non-traditional means. Globalization and the rapid advancement of technology has 
changed great power politics and the utility of force. This change demands new strategies 
and policies, if the U.S. led international order is to thrive. To describe empirically how 
the utility of force has changed, this thesis examines some recent conflicts, threats, and 
interactions involving Russia, China, and the United States. Key topics include hybrid 
warfare, election interference, certain cyber events, and the tense situation in the South 
China Sea. Following the analyses, policy recommendations for the United States are 
made.  
Russian and Chinese actions have catalyzed the evolution of geopolitics in 
Eurasia and increasingly threatened U.S. interests in the region. Russia is a major threat 
to the United States and is developing new weapons and technologies to threaten U.S. 
assets both internationally and in outer space. Furthermore, Russia’s use of hybrid 
warfare and election interference raises major domestic concerns and challenges. Russia 
currently poses the greatest military threat to the United States but has less potential for 
growth and long-term strategic disruption when compared to China. Thus, a more 
 
4 Coats, Daniel R. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community.” ODNI, Office of the 






traditional policy of strong deterrence and strategic messaging is recommended—
especially with regard to cyber threats and interference in essential democratic processes. 
One of the greatest challenges for the United States in the 21st Century will be 
adapting to and shaping the evolving international order in a way that satisfies and favors 
U.S. equities, while also addressing the core interests of the Communist Party of China—
to encourage further assimilation into the current order. China has more recently become 
a major threat to the interests of the United States and has grown and expanded its 
influence not only in the Eurasian region, but globally. It has high potential for continued 
growth and expansion both economically and militarily. China has invested a large 
portion of its wealth in new technology and military capabilities and has continued to 
steal cutting-edge military advances and technology from other countries—particularly 
the United States. China’s domestic aircraft carrier program is eventually expected to 
launch multiple modern aircraft carriers, including one that is similar in size and 
capability to the newest U.S. carrier class—the Gerald R. Ford. This will impact the 
balance of power and geopolitics of the region and will continue to afford China more 
military leverage. In addition to the use of cyber capacities against the United States, 
China has also been developing and testing various outer space and anti-satellite 
capabilities that threaten U.S. assets.  
Growth in Chinese influence and power is inevitable, and U.S. strategy and policy 
must take this into greater account. The U.S. response to China should be different than 
the response to Russia. If strong Chinese growth continues, sooner or later their concerns 
in Eurasia—as well as their concerns regarding the current international order as a 




with China toward determining what it would take for China to become a willing and 
more productive member of the current international order—instead of a revisionist 
power trying to supplant it. If this is to be accomplished, major powers benefiting from 
the current order must be willing to make significant concessions of value. Additionally, 
if concessions are to be made, it is in the best interest of the status quo powers to make 
them sooner rather than later. As China continues to grow, it will gain more leverage and 
will demand greater concessions—making reaching an agreement more difficult. Thus, it 
is in the best interest of the United States to prioritize cooperation with Beijing now, 
while also managing Chinese growth and ensuring that China becomes a constructive 
member of the current international order.  
That goal includes promoting the rule of international law and the U.S. should 
ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). Finally, the 
U.S. must remain a strong and continuing presence in the Indo-Pacific. It is in the United 
States’ best interest to provide more funding for political, military, and economic 
initiatives in the region and to assure allies and partners in the region of its continued 
commitment. These actions will help ensure that the U.S. will be negotiating from a 
position of strength and will be able to resolutely respond if China commits fully to 







The Utility of Force in the 21st Century 
 
The utility of force, in the sense of direct physical fighting, has been reduced in 
the 21st century, making war between major powers’ militaries highly unlikely. Defense 
and deterrence are still essential and necessary, but the importance has shifted from 
physical territorial control over an adversary to political control and influence by other 
means. New capabilities and advancements in technology have changed the context and 
shifted the traditional utility of force—changing the character of war. The U.S. 
Department of Defense has even recognized this in the most recent unclassified version 
of the National Defense Strategy stating that the “security environment is also affected by 
rapid technological advancements and the changing character of war.”5 
 The invention of nuclear weapons and their proliferation has drastically increased 
the escalatory risks of waging political violence against others—especially against a 
nuclear power. Additionally, even if a nation is not a nuclear power, large scale political 
violence against another nation has still become riskier. The constant threat of an external 
power deciding that it wants to impact the outcome of a conflict increases the likelihood 
of unexpected escalation that could fundamentally change the conflict. If a great power 
decides that it is in its best interest for one side to win a conflict—or simply that it did not 
 






want one or any of the sides to emerge victorious—they have multiple ways to change 
the dynamic of the conflict, through direct force, covert action, cyberattacks, military 
assistance, economic sanctions, and/or political pressure. The addition of cyberwarfare 
and new technologies in recent years have continually added more means below large 
scale armed conflict and it is likely that this trend will continue. As more of these 
capabilities are employed successfully, research and development will remain a priority.  
 Investing in militaries and building the capabilities to use force is still necessary 
to ensure that the escalatory ladder creates ample risk to continue to be a strong deterrent. 
For example, a nuclear power need not explicitly threaten the use of nuclear weapons to 
achieve a deterrent effect. Simply having the capability to mutually assure destruction 
(MAD) is enough to fundamentally increase the escalatory risk of engaging in any type of 
conflict. This is why escalation management is so critical in the 21st century. There will 
always be an us vs. them mentality somewhere in the world. Therefore, there will always 
be an actual or potential adversary. How nations and groups plan and strategize for 
interactions with their adversaries has evolved to require extreme caution with regard to 
escalation. Whether considering a nuclear attack, armed conflict, use of cyber 
capabilities, espionage, space weaponization, predatory economics or even election 
influence, extreme caution and due regard to escalation risk must always be taken to 
formulate an effective strategy in the 21st century. While limited war and MAD are not 
new topics, the rapid growth and development of new technologies has led to additional 
challenges that are less black and white. Cyberweapons, artificial intelligence, 




made escalation management more complex, but no less important. Without a proper 
escalation management strategy, plans will not survive first contact with a major power.  
 In terms of complexity, recent technological advances challenge traditional 
thinking of the use and utility of force. For example, a cyberweapon that causes physical 
damage to a nation’s critical infrastructure that impacts national security, or even a 
population’s safety, must still be deemed as a use of force. However, cyber-attacks on 
servers to steal information may seem more similar to traditional espionage than to force 
for some—even if this attack causes some property, software, or monetary damage. The 
difficulty is distinguishing between types of attacks within this domain that all may be 
classified differently by different people, nations, or institutions—especially when there 
is an infinite number of possible variations. Thus, even if all nations wanted cyber arms 
control, creating effective agreements or laws limiting this domain would likely prove 
incredibly difficult, if not impossible. Therefore, nations are left to make difficult and 
complex judgements regarding both offense and defense in this domain with due regard 
to escalation management—especially, when the adversarial nation or actor has 
developed either actual nuclear capability or a nuclear-like technological capability. 
Additionally, it requires cyber actors (both state and non-state) to consider hybrid 
ramifications of even small attacks, counterattacks, and escalations both within and 
outside of the cyber domain. Each actor making these rapid and complex decisions in this 
domain leaves significant room for dangerous miscalculation—especially in a domain 
where attribution can prove difficult. 
There are strong incentives to limit the use of force, however there is still 




support of groups and nations with similar interests still plays a significant role. This can 
achieve national policy objectives with minimal escalatory risk and, in some cases, can 
even be done while hiding the hand of the actors involved. Some examples include covert 
action, counterterrorism operations, intra-state conflict, and proxy wars. Actors have been 
able to effectively utilize an amount of force that is limited enough to not provoke a 
major escalation, but still achieves their main political objectives. 
Given the limited utility of force, states are incentivized to find utility elsewhere 
to gain greater power, influence, and control over outcomes. The utility of economics in 
the 21st century has been a major focus for many actors—but has been especially evident 
for China. The Chinese government has made it clear that they intend to change the status 
quo and create a region and world in which China holds a stronger and more influential 
position in the global order. With the understanding of today’s limited utility of force, 
China has been playing a long-term economic strategy to achieve great power status and 
increase its global influence.6 It has been capitalizing on a large workforce, dedicating 
significant resources to foreign investments, and using its rapidly growing economy to 
become a major influencer in the region. “China’s double-digit economic growth has 
slowed recently, but it served to fund several successive defense modernization Five-
Year Plans”.7 
 
6 Mastro, Oriana Skylar. “The Stealth Superpower.” Foreign Affairs, Foreign Affairs Magazine, 4 Feb. 
2019, www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/china-plan-rule-asia. 
 
7 United States, Defense Intelligence Agency. (2019, January 3). China Military Power. Retrieved April 





Additionally, China has realized it is much cheaper and faster to steal cutting edge 
technologies from other countries than to dedicate vast amounts of resources on 
developing them from scratch. It is clear that the Peoples Liberation Army and its 
Naval branch (PLAN) are growing and modernizing at a rapid pace—especially with 
regard to its aircraft carrier program.8 Having a modern navy with similar capabilities to 
the United States automatically provides status, influence, and deterrence—even without 
any explicit threat—which can shift the geopolitical situation without the actual use of 
force.  
The ability to modernize and grow the military this rapidly is a product of actions 
taken below the threshold of armed conflict. The strategy has included economic 
priorities, cyber operations, and effective intelligence operations. According to the 2017 
National Security Strategy of the United States,  
Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. intellectual property valued at 
hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary technology and early-stage 
ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of free societies.9  
 
This has become a significant way for adversaries to achieve political goals without using 
force and without major risk. 
Russia, in some instances, has taken an approach that involves greater risk of 
escalation than other actors, but this is a product of Russia’s less fortunate geopolitical 
 
8 Mizokami, Kyle. “China Could Have 4 Aircraft Carriers by 2022: Should the Navy Be Worried?” The 
National Interest, The Center for the National Interest, 12 Sept. 2018, 
nationalinterest.org/blog/buzz/china-could-have-4-aircraft-carriers-2022-should-navy-be-worried-
31077. 
9 United States, The White House. (2017, December). National Security Strategy of the United States of 





and economic situation. The Russian economy is extremely dependent on natural 
resource production (mainly oil and gas) and does not have the Chinese luxury of playing 
a long-term strategy that is primarily focused on economics. The Russian mindset, and 
subsequently its strategy, is based heavily on a historical pattern of defeats and a desire to 
gain back some of its previous Soviet glory. This mindset combined with President 
Putin’s previous career as a KGB officer places a premium on military strength; however, 
Putin still understands the limited utility of force and utilizes restraint.  
As seen in Ukraine, military deception and focused information operations were 
utilized to sow confusion and make reaction and further escalation extremely difficult and 
delayed. This was what created the time and space for the main objectives to be achieved 
rapidly, while also deterring a major escalatory response by the West. Putin also 
understood that he needed to limit his campaign to Crimea and eastern Ukraine. A full 
military incursion that was meant to completely take over the Ukrainian state would have 
required significantly more force, resources, and time. The elements of surprise and 
confusion that were created by the advanced information operations and relatively limited 
use of force would have eventually been lost—and the possibility of major escalation by 
the U.S. and other states would have increased substantially. While taking over 
Sevastopol was an important military objective, making a move on Ukraine was 
motivative by geopolitical strategy. 
NATO-Russia relations in Eurasia can be described as geopolitical chess. Russian 
military strength and advanced technological capabilities are important for attempting to 




the 30th member of the Alliance.10 Although North Macedonia is not geographically close 
to Russia, it is evidence that NATO is still enlarging and “[a]t the 2008 Bucharest 
Summit, the Allies agreed that Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO in 
the future.”11 Russia is appropriately concerned that NATO enlargement will decrease 
Russia’s relative power and influence both in the economic and political realms. 
Additionally, NATO enlargement in Eurasia decreases and, in some cases, eliminates 
buffer zones that Russia views as important. Even if assuming complete Russian 
confidence that NATO poses no offensive military threat, it still has reasons to oppose 
NATO enlargement. As more neighboring states become members of NATO and receive 
security guarantees, the amount of actions or moves Russia can take without invoking 
Article 5 or running into significant political opposition become more limited. 
Conversely, NATO and the U.S. gain more freedom of action as NATO expands, 
especially when expansion is linked to a widening zone of Western economic and 
political integration and growth. That linkage between military expansion and economic 
and political power helps to explain why Russia tries to expand where it can and weaken 
the U.S. and NATO whenever there is an opportunity. For example, in addition to its 
actions in Ukraine and Syria, Russia has been expanding into the Arctic militarily.12 The 
 
10 NATO. (2020, March 30). North Macedonia's flag raised at NATO Headquarters, following accession to 
NATO. Retrieved April 22, 2020, from 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_174648.htm?selectedLocale=en 
 
11 NATO. (2020, April 7). Enlargement. Retrieved April 22, 2020, from 
https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49212.htm 
 
12 Gramer, R. (2019, June 1). Here's What Russia's Military Build-Up in the Arctic Looks Like. Retrieved 





northern approach is not only the closest and most likely route that either the U.S. or 
Russia would take for an attack, but also is home to vast natural resources including oil 
and natural gas.  
Russian economic expansion and growth is limited relative to other great powers. 
Therefore, the development and use of various means just below the threshold of armed 
great-power conflict have been a top priority for the Russians. Due to Russia’s 
geopolitical and economic situation, the Russian policy accepts more risk and they are 
more willing to test out gray-zone/hybrid capabilities. However, the Russian’s still take 
great caution to stay below the threshold of provoking a major escalatory response from 
their adversaries. General O’Shaugnessy, the Commander of U.S. Northern Command 
(NORTHCOM) and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) has 
spoken publicly to Congress about this threat from Russia and other adversaries:  
[K]ey adversaries have demonstrated patterns of behavior that indicate they 
currently have the capability, capacity, and intent to hold our homeland at 
significant risk below the threshold of nuclear war. Eroding military advantage is 
undermining our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter 
aggression against the homeland. This is emboldening competitors and 
adversaries to challenge us at home, holding at risk our people, our critical 
infrastructure, and our ability to project power forward.13  
 
Although Russia has been more aggressive and has risked greater escalation, the 
strategy has largely been effective—as the U.S. has not significantly escalated. Russia is 
clearly testing the boundaries to try to determine exactly how limited the use of force is in 
the 21st century. It is clear that the U.S. is capable of escalating but has so far been 
 
13 Statement of General Terrence J. O'Shaughnessy Before the House Armed Services Committee 







unwilling. For the current administration, the risks and costs up to this point have 
apparently outweighed the benefits of significant escalation by the U.S. If the United 
States was willing to escalate through retaliation and effectively communicated this 
willingness, then the Russian’s would likely recalculate and further bound and limit their 
operations. However, the Russians are currently willing to wade into unexplored waters 
and find out just how far they can go without significant consequence—in other words, 
figuring out what actions do and don’t cause significant escalation. The Russians are 
trying to determine exactly where that threshold (or line) actually is in the current 
geopolitical context. However, this is not only a probing/scouting maneuver, but also is a 
mission that has “battle” tested capabilities and achieved significant effects on its 
targets—as evidenced by the 2017 U.S. intelligence community assessment on Russian 
election interference.14 
There is currently a limited utility of force and it is very likely to continue into the 
near future; however, if there is fundamental change in the current conditions, the utility 
of force could exponentially increase. Some events or circumstances that could 
potentially cause a resurgence in the utility of force are listed and described below:  
Pivotal Discoveries 
or Inventions: 
(either on Earth or 
in outer space) 
Fundamental 
Change in Great 
Power 
Relationships: 














(where one nation or 
group holds a vast and 
consequential 
comparative advantage 
over all others) 
 
14 Office of the Director of National Intelligence.  “Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent 







If any of these or other major shifts—like regime change—occur, then global geopolitics 
could change fundamentally. These examples and others would result in significant 
change in actors’ cost-benefit analyses. If a country is suffering from major famine, for 
example, the survivability of the state could be threatened. In this instance, the Hobbesian 
state of nature could kick in and make states and people act in ways they would not have 
otherwise. The risk of escalation and the cost of using more force may actually become 
worth the potential benefits of achieving certain political or physical gains through force. 
Caution would still be necessary—because ultimately getting nuked would not increase 
survival chances—but pushing the boundaries without breaching the nuclear threshold 
may certainly be more favorable when a state or its people are fighting for survival.   
In the current state of international relations and security, there is a limited utility 
of force; however, the degree to which force continues to be limited in the future is still in 
question. This will be determined by many factors, but escalation management will 
continue to play an important role regardless. As we have seen with globalization and the 
invention of the internet, new technologies have the potential to rapidly transform the 
economic and security environments. Therefore, in order to improve the likelihood of 
long-term success, competing great powers must have a strategy to remain vigilant in 
retaining various capabilities in many different areas in order to have the ability to 
continuously adapt to challenges in the 21st century and beyond.  In today’s rapidly 
evolving global environment, adaptability is absolutely critical to the long-term success 




system that is destined for failure, but a system that adapts and effectively manages 
change will thrive. 
States wishing to either remain great or continue gaining influence must have the 
ability to pivot when necessary to meet the demands of a changing world. A very capable 
diplomatic arm combined with a strong military and thriving economy will better position 
a state to be able to adapt quickly to threats while also attracting partners. Economic 
strength not only provides the resources necessary to effectively respond to threats, but 
also the resources to retain capabilities and develop new ones. A strong economy also 
contributes to increased morale of citizens: as Napoleon Bonaparte said, morale is to the 
physical as three to one.  
Globalization and the rapid advancement of technological capabilities have 
increased the complexity of deterrence, defense, warfighting, and escalation 
management. Major advancements in cyberwarfare, space, artificial intelligence, and 
nuclear delivery systems—like hypersonic glide vehicles—have expanded the traditional 
nuclear concept of mutually assured destruction and the retaliatory risks of using force. 
Achieving greater power and influence today, due to the increase in escalatory risk and 
cost, has mainly (but not entirely) shifted the means of conflict to those which are 
typically below the threshold of armed conflict. The current state of the world contains 
the necessary conditions for these limitations of the utility of force. However, as new 
technologies emerge, the utility of force will also continue to evolve. The United States 
must be properly prepared and positioned to adapt to the future environment. As stated 
clearly in the 2018 National Defense Strategy, Russia and China must be the primary 




security and prosperity.15 The next section addresses U.S. relations and policy regarding 
Russia and is followed by a section on China.  
 








U.S.-Russian Relations and Hybrid Warfare 
 
“The risk of interstate conflict, including among great powers, is higher than at any time 
since the end of the Cold War.”16 
 —2018 Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community 
 
In modern warfare, new technologies and strategies have created an evolution of the 
manner in which conflict occurs. The terms hybrid warfare, new generation warfare, and 
others have been used to describe warfare which has more than one facet. These facets 
include conventional, unconventional, cyber, and influence campaigns—such as 
disinformation spread on social media and targeted election interference. Since Russia is 
a major power, and historically has been an adversary of the United States, understanding 
Russian actions and methods of conflict is essential for the Homeland Defense of the 
United States.  
Russia has used hybrid tactics within the U.S. and in conflicts abroad. Russia has 
utilized many different aspects of hybrid warfare, especially in the military realm. 
Regarding modern-day hybrid tactics abroad, the following section uses the Ukrainian 
conflict as a case study. The 2017 National Security Strategy of the United States 
describes some Russian views and threats: 
Russia aims to weaken U.S. influence in the world and divide us from our allies and 
partners. Russia views the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and European 
 
16 Coats, Daniel R. “Worldwide Threat Assessment of the Intelligence Community.” ODNI, Office of the 






Union (EU) as threats. Russia is investing in new military capabilities, including 
nuclear systems that remain the most significant existential threat to the United 
States, and in destabilizing cyber capabilities. Through modernized forms of 
subversive tactics, Russia interferes in the domestic political affairs of countries 
around the world. The combination of Russian ambition and growing military 
capabilities creates an unstable frontier in Eurasia, where the risk of conflict due to 
Russian miscalculation is growing.17 
 
The constant threats from Russia are still evolving and the U.S. response must be 
adaptive, vigilant, and proactive. This section evaluates the hybrid threat from Russia and 
makes policy recommendations for threat mitigation. 
 It is essential to define the scope of the threat Russia poses to its adversaries and 
enemies. Christopher Chivvis from the Rand Corporation, testifying before the House of 
Representatives’ Committee on Armed Services described the scope of Russian hybrid 
warfare:  
As used today in reference to Russia, “hybrid warfare” refers to Moscow’s use of 
a broad range of subversive instruments, many of which are nonmilitary, to 
further Russian national interests. Moscow seeks to use hybrid warfare to ensure 
compliance on a number of specific policy questions; to divide and weaken 
NATO; to subvert pro-Western governments; to create pretexts for war; to annex 
territory; and to ensure access to European markets on its own terms.18 
 
It is important to note that this warfare not only includes tactics taken on the ground in 
physical military combat, but also has a very large nonmilitary component.  The 
following section focuses on the components of cyber, information operations, 
psychological operations, and election interference. 
 
17 United States, The White House. (2017, December). National Security Strategy of the United States of 
America. Retrieved April 16, 2019, from https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905.pdf 
 







Russia’s War on U.S. Democracy 
 
 The great power and liberal democratic ideology of the U.S. will always create 
adversaries like Russia. Timothy Snyder, in his book The Road to Unfreedom, uses the 
term “strategic relativism” to describes the Russian foreign policy goal of making others 
weaker in order to benefit the Russian position geopolitically. If one of the strongest 
actors in the world and in Europe/Eurasia (the U.S.) is weakened, then Russia will gain 
relative strength. Snyder also argues that Russia is very limited in the amount of absolute 
strength that it can attain, which is why the relative gains are so imperative.19  
 This argument helps to explain one significant reason why Russia has taken to 
Hybrid Warfare tactics—and more specifically, cyber and information warfare aimed at 
the very foundation of the U.S. government. President Donald Trump has rejected the 
notion that President Putin targeted and attempted to influence the 2016 election; 
however, the intelligence community (including CIA, FBI, NSA, and ODNI) released an 
unclassified assessment of Russian influence and direction. 
We assess Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 
2016 aimed at the US presidential election. Russia’s goals were to undermine 
public faith in the US democratic process, denigrate Secretary Clinton, and harm 
her electability and potential presidency. We further assess Putin and the Russian 
Government developed a clear preference for President-elect Trump.20 
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These parts of the Intelligence Community (IC) further assess that the campaign, directed 
by Putin, was hybrid in nature. This campaign utilized covert cyber intelligence 
operations as well as “overt efforts by Russian Government agencies, state-funded media, 
third-party intermediaries, and paid social media users or ‘trolls’.” The IC has also stated 
that Russia has had a long-time desire to undermine the U.S.-led liberal democratic 
order.21 
Undermining U.S. democracy in a globalized cyberage environment has become 
much less difficult. The proliferation of online social media has become a perfect 
medium for influencing operations and information warfare. The ease of penetration by 
adversaries to effectively disseminate any desired information to a large portion of the 
population is troubling. Specifically, the use of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google 
were used as platforms to expose American voters to Russian propaganda. The Internet 
Research Agency (IRA), a Russian cyberwar center, attempted to manipulate opinions of 
Europeans and Americans about the Ukrainian conflict as well as the 2016 presidential 
election. The IRA had about 470 Facebook sites claiming to be American political 
organizations and six of them had 340 million shares of content each. Types of 
manipulation included Anti-Muslim ads, to people in Michigan and Wisconsin, as well as 
falsely declaring that one could vote by text message.22 The FBI has a role to play in this 
arena; it has already removed many Facebook accounts, because of “coordinated 
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inauthentic behavior”.23 The FBI needs to continue this work to find and intervene when 
IRA and other Russian government associated accounts are found. The private sector also 
has an important role to play in combating this threat—the government and private sector 
working together to address this threat is essential and is considered in greater detail in 
my recommendations. 
Leading up to the election, the FBI discovered Russian cyber-infiltration of the 
Democratic National Committee (DNC). Additionally, it became clear that Russia was 
able to get into White House and Department of State systems, gaining access to 
classified emails. During these attacks, Moscow was not terribly concerned with the U.S. 
knowing it was behind the attacks and even fought to stay in the systems even after being 
discovered. 24 After stealing information, Russia has utilized various tools to launder and 
disseminate it publicly, including to WikiLeaks. 
As stated in the 2017 National Security Strategy, “Rival actors use propaganda 
and other means to try to discredit democracy. They advance anti-Western views and 
spread false information to create divisions among ourselves, our allies, and our 
partners.”25 During the Ukrainian conflict and the 2016 election, we have seen more 
direct actions, an increase in the level of activity, and a widening scope of effort 
compared to previous operations. It was even determined that “Russian intelligence 
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obtained and maintained access to elements of multiple US state or local electoral 
boards”.26  In this case, DHS assessed the systems compromised were not involved in 
vote tallying.27 It is important to note the potential impact to the legitimacy and 
confidence in the electoral process. This was an attack on democracy; even without direct 
access to vote tallying or the ability to directly alter votes, it threatens American 
confidence in the system which is essential for peaceful transfer of power—which is a 
clear threat to U.S. national security. 
 
The Conflict in Ukraine  
 
In the years leading up to the conflict with Russia, Ukraine flirted with two 
mutually exclusive options: joining either the European Union or the Eurasian Union (its 
Russian-led counterpart in the East). Both of these regional systems of integration would 
benefit from Ukraine joining them in both political and economic terms. Unfortunately 
for Russia, despite attempts to entice Ukraine with cheap financing and energy discounts, 
Ukraine seemed to keep favoring the West. Most, but not all, Ukrainian citizens have a 
strong desire to align with the West—as evidenced by the Ukrainian Revolution in 
February 2014. This Revolution resulted in the removal of Ukrainian President 
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Yanukovych for, amongst other actions, his last-minute signing of a treaty and loan 
agreement with Russia—instead of the association agreement with the European Union.28  
Putin’s attempts at politically achieving his goal of keeping Ukraine in the Eastern 
sphere of influence failed and Ukraine’s trajectory turned Westward. After accepting that 
fact, his next move was to mitigate the negative impact it would have on Russia and 
demonstrate the consequences to Ukraine and other western sliding countries. In 2014, 
Russia occupied and annexed Crimea and subsequently began sending its troops across 
the border into Ukraine. This use of force was reliant on confusion and information 
operations. “Little green men” who were dressed in Russian uniforms without insignias 
and armed with modern Russian weaponry were utilized. Russia officially made remarks 
stating that they were Crimean self-defense forces and not Russian troops. In response to 
people claiming that these little green men were actually Russian troops without 
insignias, President Putin responded by stating: “Take a look at the post-Soviet states. 
There are many uniforms there that are similar. You can go to a store and buy any kind of 
uniform.”29 This effectively caused confusion, but U.S. officials concluded that Russian 
troops had crossed into Ukraine.30 This made a common understanding of what was 
actually happening very difficult and domestic and international responses were 
effectively delayed by the Russian tactics. The strategy successfully, at least initially, 
 
28Nadia Diuk. Euromaidan: Ukraine’s Self-Organizing Revolution. April 2014. 
29 Schreck, C. (2019, February 26). From 'Not Us' To 'Why Hide It?': How Russia Denied Its Crimea 
Invasion, Then Admitted It. Retrieved December 17, 2019, from https://www.rferl.org/a/from-not-
us-to-why-hide-it-how-russia-denied-its-crimea-invasion-then-admitted-it/29791806.html. 
 
30 Butenko, V., Smith-Spark, L., & Magnay, D. (2014, August 29). U.S. official says 1,000 Russian troops 






blurred lines and caused a questioning of who the actors were and what exactly was 
going on—and ultimately concluded with a successful annexation of Crimea by the 
Russians.   
 Ukraine’s strategic importance is not limited to the economic and political 
realms.  As stated by Robert Donaldson and Joseph Nogee, the proposed expansion of 
NATO to include Ukraine in the late 2000s seriously angered Putin, who believe that 
“Ukrainian membership would be … catastrophic for Russia because of the historical ties 
between the two Slavic states, the large Russian population in eastern Ukraine, and the 
location of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol in the Crimea.”31 Crimea’s geographic 
location makes it an extremely important strategic asset for Russia. The port city of 
Sevastopol is especially important for its Navy, because it is where Russia’s all-important 
Black Sea Fleet is based. After the Soviet Union dissolved, Ukraine had been leasing the 
base to Russia. This base has been critical for Russian power projection in the region. 
The fleet enabled blockading during the war with Georgia and provides naval access to 
the Middle East. More recently, the Syrian civil war and Putin’s support of the Assad 
regime made the port even more critical. Sevastopol can be, and allegedly has been, a 
critical supply route from Russia to Syria.32 Currently, Crimea is claimed by both Russia 
and Ukraine. Additionally, despite the Minsk II agreement to a ceasefire, the conflict in 
eastern Ukraine continues. Meanwhile, The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
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Europe has set up a Special Monitoring Mission in Ukraine to “observe and report in an 
impartial and objective way on the situation in Ukraine; and to facilitate dialogue among 




General Philip M. Breedlove, who was the Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
of NATO Allied Command Operations from May 2013 until May 2016, has stated: 
Competitors have operationalized hybrid strategies and brought together multiple 
lines of effort to achieve goals that can threaten our security. … Russian military 
actions in the Ukraine crisis reflect a sophisticated, complex, multi-variant 
approach to the use of force to achieve decisive political objectives. Russian 
strategists and planners have taken the classic elements of Soviet and Russian 
military thinking, combined them with 21st century tools, tactics, and capabilities, 
and created new models for military action that are adapted to Russia’s strategic 
situation.34 
 
Modern Russian campaigns, including inside Ukraine, have included the use of proxy 
forces to achieve Russian goals—also called “Proxy Sanctuary”.35 Additionally, of great 
importance in cyberage campaigns has been the targeting and exploitation of the 
adversary’s population through advanced information and influence operations. Russia 
has been able to accomplish significant effects and impacts on its adversaries through the 
dedication of resources and effort to leverage the modern information environment. This 
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has been a target on the people/societal part of Clausewitz’s trinity. The election 
interference has also started to trickle over into threatening governance structures through 
direct attacks compromising security which could impact the confidence in the electoral 
system. 
 NORAD/USNORTHCOM commander General O’Shaugnessy has described 
Russia’s actions as “exploiting gaps between the traditional understanding of ‘peace’ and 
‘war’”, with the goal of advancing Moscow’s interests by aggressively encroaching on 
the sovereignty of its neighbors including in Ukraine. He also recognizes the difficulty in 
figuring out how to respond in ways that help to solve the problems and deter this type of 
behavior in the future.36  
In the 2018 National Cyber Strategy, signed by President Trump, it is made clear that 
“America’s prosperity and security depend on how we respond to the opportunities and 
challenges in cyberspace”.37 It is clear that the IC is committed to the recognition and 
defense of the nation’s cyber security regardless of where the threats originate. The IC 
publicly claims with high confidence that “Russia, Iran, and North Korea have conducted 
reckless cyber-attacks that harmed American and international businesses”.38  
As an attempt to deter Russian interference in the 2020 election, U.S. Cyber 
Command publicly threatened to release personal information of “senior members of 
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Russia’s government as well as Russian oligarchs, stopping short of targeting Vladimir 
Putin himself”, if Russian interference operations were attempted.39 This type of warning 
and threat could help to deter these type of actions. Stopping short of threatening the 
release of President Putin’s information could also help to contain some further Russian 
escalation—and holding information on Putin in reserve as leverage that the U.S. could 
use at a different time could prove valuable. In addition, economic sanctions, political 
pressure, and cyber counterattacks should continue to be considered and utilized as 
necessary in reaction to actions taken by Russia against the United States. These 
measures need to be supported by both the executive and legislative branches in order to 
achieve meaningful effects. The use and coordination of multiple levels and departments 
within one government towards the same goal is referred to as a whole-of-government 
approach. It is essential to use this approach in order for the government to be more 
efficient, effective, and decrease redundancies. In many cases, this approach can be more 
likely to accomplish the policy objectives. 
Defending against threats in the cyber domain require a coordinated and unified 
effort, which is why it is vital that the entire executive branch commit to public 
recognition of Russian attacks and the defense of the nation against this threat. It is 
critical for national security to protect the democratic system and retain the confidence in 
electoral processes. As such, one way to protect the process and retain citizen confidence 
is a paper/mail-in ballot system similar to that utilized by Colorado be implemented 
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nationwide. This would severely cripple the attempts of malevolent actors to be able to 
interfere with the accuracy and legitimacy of an American’s vote. Implementing this 
recommendation faces formidable political obstacles, but if achieved would provide 
much greater security and confidence. The For the People Act of 2019 has a subsection 
named the Voter Confidence and Increased Accessibility Act of 2019. It was passed in 
the U.S. House of Representatives on March 8th, 2019 but has not made it through the 
U.S. Senate. Section 1502 of the Act addresses the paper ballot issue: 
The voting system shall require the use of an individual, durable, voter-verified 
paper ballot of the voter’s vote that shall be marked and made available for 
inspection and verification by the voter before the voter’s vote is cast and 
counted, and which shall be counted by hand or read by an optical character 
recognition device or other counting device.40 
 
Passage of the Act would represent a major step toward securing U.S. elections against 
what are likely to be more sophisticated attacks than occurred in 2016.  
In addition, in order to help defend against foreign influencing operations and 
strengthen national and homeland security, the United States should implement what I 
would propose to call the Responsible Patriot Liaison (RPL) program. This program 
would work similarly to the model used in Terrorism/Threat Liaison Programs, such as 
seen between the Colorado Information Analysis Center (CIAC) and its public and 
private sector partners—which are called Threat Liaison Officers. The RPL program 
would forge these partnerships to defend against this and other threats. There will 
continue to be a fierce debate on privacy vs. national security; however, foreign influence 
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campaigns have targeted democracy and attempted to erode the foundations on which it 
stands. It is essential for private companies to take more responsibility in protecting the 
U.S. and its citizens from the type of Russian operations seen during U.S. elections. 
Responsible Patriot Liaisons (RPLs) would be employees from companies that have been 
utilized for these types of attacks such as Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, and Google. The 
RPL volunteer would be cleared for information related to these threats and, when 
necessary, will be given assistance by the government to combat these threats. 
Additionally, the RPL would be the contact for the government if assistance from the 
company is necessary.  
Google, Twitter, and Facebook have voluntarily agreed to help with tackling 
disinformation on their platforms in the European Union and the European Commission 
produced a report in June 2019 regarding the relationship: 
Disinformation is a rapidly changing threat. The tactics used by internal and 
external actors, in particular linked to Russian sources, are evolving as quickly as 
the measures adopted by states and online platforms … Online platforms have a 
particular responsibility in tackling disinformation. Today the Commission also 
publishes the latest monthly reports by Google, Twitter and Facebook under the 
self-regulatory Code of Practice on Disinformation. The May reports confirm the 
trend of previous Commission assessments. Since January, all platforms have 
made progress with regard to the transparency of political advertising and public 
disclosure of such ads in libraries that provide useful tools for the analysis of ad 
spending by political actors across the EU. Facebook has taken steps to ensure the 
transparency of issue-based advertising, while Google and Twitter need to catch 
up in this regard.41 
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A similar type of voluntary agreement could also prove useful between the United States 
and various private sector companies with the designated RPL being the contact for 
related issues. 
To counter the effectiveness and impact of Russian information and psychological 
operations on the U.S. military, the United States should implement an awareness 
training program for deploying units. This program would expose these units to specific 
types of adversarial tactics and reduce psychological impact in the field. Using electronic 
warfare assets to try to block these operations would also be advised. The employment of 
cyber defenders or self-defense hacking units will deter and decrease the effectiveness of 
such operations against U.S. and allied forces.  
It is clear that operations security (OPSEC) has been threatened by the use of 
personal technology by soldiers in deployed environments. The use of personal fitness 
apps with GPS tracking has created publicly available information that can be used to 
find locations of military bases and regular routes taken by solders. As a quick fix to the 
problem, On August 6, 2018, the Pentagon stated that “Defense Department personnel 
are prohibited from using geolocation features and functionality on government and 
nongovernment-issued devices, applications and services while in locations designated as 
operational areas”.42 Issues like these will continue to occur as new technology becomes 
available. New technologies will continue to be developed and utilized at a rate faster 
than policy analysis, development, and implementation can occur. To recognize and 
adapt to new technologies as quickly as possible, the U.S. should task a small analytical 
 
42 Garamone, Jim. “New Policy Prohibits GPS Tracking in Deployed Settings.” U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 




unit within each operational governmental organization with proactive analysis of its own 
OPSEC in the realm of new technologies and applications. This unit would also make 
recommendations on the policies regarding use of these technologies. The U.S. 
government must not be reactive in the realm of OPSEC. Implementation of policies 
restricting the type of GPS devices allowed on base should not occur after significant 
damage to national security has occurred. Securing national security must be proactive; 
focusing a group of analysts on emerging technological threats will help increase the 







Sino-U.S. Relations and Managing China’s 
Rise 
 
“We are facing increased global disorder, characterized by decline in the long-standing 
rules-based international order—creating a security environment more complex and 
volatile than any we have experienced in recent memory. Inter-state strategic 
competition, not terrorism, is now the primary concern in U.S. national security…China 
is a strategic competitor using predatory economics to intimidate its neighbors while 
militarizing features in the South China Sea.”43 —2018 National Defense Strategy 
 
China has been growing at a rapid rate economically, militarily, and 
technologically. With the increase in power and influence, we have witnessed China 
increasingly acting as a revisionist power. The Chinese government has made clear that it 
intends to change the status quo and gain a a stronger and more influential position in its 
region and globally. As the strongest global power and greatest benefactor of the status 
quo, the United States sees China as a major threat to U.S. interests. China recognizes the 
U.S. as the greatest obstacle to revising the world order and accomplishing its major 
policy goals. Various Chinese actions have stoked major concern in the United States. 
For example, China has been aggressively targeting the U.S. and others through various 
means including hacking, cyber warfare, espionage, and attempts to alter territorial 
boundaries in the South China Sea. These activities are enduring threats to the U.S. and 
its partners. 
 






Every country, to include the United States, has limited resources. In an attempt to 
allocate limited resources as effectively as possible, for the defense of the country and 
promotion of national interests, assessment and prioritization of threats and challenges is 
essential. To designate something as a “threat” requires an actor to have both capability 
and intent. China is a threat to the United States in some specific areas (particularly in the 
cyber domain) and is a threat to U.S. interests; however, China does not currently pose an 
existential threat to the United States homeland or to the destruction of the international 
order.  
At this point, there is no evidence that China intends to engage in armed conflict 
with any major power or completely overthrow the international order. It is not in the best 
interest of the government to attempt either of these. Beijing clearly seeks to continue 
growing its economy and gain greater influence in current systems. China wants a greater 
share of influence and decision-making ability, which could take place in current systems 
and organizations. Beijing has also launched major new initiatives in order to extend its 
influence, most notably the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure 
Investment Bank (AIIB).  
How the U.S. reacts to the growth of the Chinese economy and increasing 
political influence will greatly impact the future of the international order. The 
geopolitical environment in the Indo-Pacific has been changing and will continue to 
change with the growth of China. As much as possible, the United States must adapt to 
these circumstances and utilize a whole-of-government approach to influence and shape 
these inevitable changes to protect U.S. interests as much as possible. Attempting to 




more diversified and, due largely because of the size of its population and impressive 
economic growth, China is emerging as a peer competitor both economically and 
militarily. Moreover, the ruling Communist Party has maintained internal cohesion, in 
large part through repression and the extensive use of surveillance technology. As such, 
the United States must recognize that a policy that tries forcibly to contain China will 
increase adversarial tension and, while it may slow China down, will likely fail in the 
long run. China’s strategy is long-term and U.S. policy must also focus on longer-term 
interests. To address Chinese strategic competition, and protect long-term U.S. interests, 
the U.S. should adopt a policy to manage China’s rise. If the United States is not involved 
heavily in the region, the vital U.S. interest of advancing American influence (Trump’s 
fourth pillar) with not be furthered. 
 
Managing China’s Rise 
 
The first requirement of creating a sound strategy and subsequent policy is a 
proper assessment of the strategic facts on the ground and context of the heavily 
globalized strategic environment. The basic premise of this strategy is the realization that 
China will continue to rise, even if Western nations try to forcibly contain it. 
Consequently, a policy of strong containment would, at most, provide short-term benefits 
and would likely sacrifice longer-term interests. The primary long-term goal of managing 
China’s rise is a minimally altered U.S. led international order with a China that acts as a 
responsible, invested shareholder in the current order. It is counterproductive and a waste 




this policy will ultimately fail anyway. Instead, the United States should pick its battles 
wisely, prioritize the most important long-term goals, and provide incentives for Beijing 
to be more invested in the current world order as it continues to grow economically and 
gain more influence. This will require some short-term sacrifices, which I will propose in 
later sections, but ultimately will promote the continuation of a U.S. led international 
order that has greater adaptability. In today’s rapidly evolving global environment, 
adaptability is absolutely critical to the long-term success of an international order. A 
static system that continually fights change at every turn is a system that is destined for 
failure, but a system that adapts and effectively manages change may thrive. 
 
Chinese Threats and Challenges 
 
Graham Allison argues in The Atlantic that “the defining question about global 
order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’s 
Trap.”44 After his team at Harvard analyzed the historical record of rising revisionist 
powers, he points out that twelve of sixteen cases over the past 500 years resulted in war. 
Additionally, he argues that “based on current trajectory, war between the United States 
and China in the decades ahead is not just possible, but much more likely than 
recognized”.45 While great power transitions are incontestably dangerous, Allison fails to 
emphasize the extent to which nuclear weapons have substantially raised the risk and cost 
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of war between great powers. While there will continue to be significant competition and 
confrontation between the U.S. and China, it is difficult to imagine that both China and 
the U.S. would be willing to risk total war. They have a strong incentive therefore to seek 
a stable balance—even if that requires substantial compromise. The current relationship 
with China is adversarial for many reasons politically, economically, and militarily—
which all make progress difficult. However, making efforts now to create a more positive 
and less adversarial Sino-American relationship may increase China’s willingness to 
assimilate into an international order with fewer revisions than are currently being 
sought.  
Pessimism about China’s intentions is largely based on the assumption of 
indefinite rule by an authoritarian regime bent on expansionism. Some scholars point out 
another possibility, in which the economic liberalization required for continued growth 
leads to political reform. Hahm Chaibong, President of the Asan Institute for Policy 
Studies, in Seoul, South Korea, believes that the growth may actually lead to the 
transformation of the authoritarian regime. In China’s Future is South Korea’s Present he 
wrote:  
There are two possible paths for China going forward: political liberalization, 
which would enable continued economic success, or authoritarian retrenchment, 
which would slowly but surely undermine China’s economic growth. The lesson 
of South Korea is that when it comes to sustaining economic growth, political 
liberalization is not a matter of choice.46 
 
Chaibong argues that economic liberalization generates pressures that even authoritarian 
leaders cannot fully repress. If this assessment is correct, it would be possible that China 
 




is on a path towards political liberalization similar to what was seen in South Korea—as 
democratization and rapid economic growth turned it into a model for the appeal of a 
liberal internationalist world order. Taking a harder line on China may impede that 
prospect and be counterproductive. 
The recent protests and riots in Hong Kong, stemming from China’s desire for 
greater political control in the region, point to the possibility that China is starting to see 
significant effects from economic liberalization. Even with broad censorship across the 
internet, people still communicate and act through other means. The protests in Hong 
Kong against increased mainland government control, seem to provide added support for 
Chaibong’s argument, as President Xi has apparently concluded that crushing Hong 
Kong’s human rights demonstrators is not worth the prospective economic and political 
costs. That hesitation could even lead to an increase in pressure within China for political 
liberalization.  
Balancing the need for close diplomatic relations with the need to deter Chinese 
actions counter to U.S. interests is a daunting task, and one can hardly exclude situations 
that make these two goals mutually exclusive. One area that has been degrading the Sino-
U.S. relationship is the cyber domain. Even though attribution in this environment can be 
extremely difficult, there have been attacks that the U.S. believes with high confidence 
have been sponsored by the Chinese government. This has made fostering this 
relationship increasingly difficult, but there are actions that can and must be taken to 





Cybercrimes, Hacking, and Espionage 
 
David Sanger, in The Perfect Weapon, describes the relationship between China 
and the U.S. as a “new cold war between the world’s two largest economies.” Sanger 
argues that China’s interests extend beyond territorial claims, as it seeks to achieve “the 
keys to reemerging as a global power … [through] artificial intelligence, space 
technology, communications, and the crunching of big data.” That goal, he notes, 
requires China to outmaneuver the United States.47  
Cyber espionage, hacking, and intellectual property theft have become major 
points of tension between the U.S. and China as well as other countries. As stated in the 
2016 U.S. National Security Strategy: “Every year, competitors such as China steal U.S. 
intellectual property valued at hundreds of billions of dollars. Stealing proprietary 
technology and early-stage ideas allows competitors to unfairly tap into the innovation of 
free societies”.48 
In Operation Aurora, conducted in 2009, Chinese hackers breached Google’s 
security and searched for source code from Google’s search engine. They wanted to 
recreate Google’s successes and create a more state favorable internet search engine 
within China. This type of cyber activity hurts the economies of countries, but generally 
has minimal impact on international security. However, as part of operation Aurora, the 
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Chinese were able to get ahold of court documents from the United States Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court and other judges around the country. This gave a serious 
advantage to China’s clandestine intelligence establishment. The ability of Chinese 
intelligence to know if its spies are compromised and under investigation, before they 
have actually been charged with a crime, is extremely advantageous.49 This has serious 
potential to undermine the FBI’s counter-intelligence operations and significantly weaken 
national security. 
 The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) hacks were another case with 
large potential consequence to U.S national security. In the summer of 2014, the SF-86 
forms for 21.5 million people were copied from the OPM’s database. By the end of the 
year, 4.2 million personnel files were stolen—which included social security numbers 
and other sensitive information. In addition, 5.6 million fingerprints also ended up stolen. 
The damage to the U.S. national security apparatus was clear. With this information, it 
would be much easier to track down spies, hack into people’s accounts, find cleared 
federal employees, determine best or most vulnerable targets for blackmail and bribery, 
and utilize or share this information in many other damaging ways.50  
Another complicating factor is that even though these capabilities and types of 
attacks seem to be highly detrimental, many countries that have advanced cyber prowess 
are hesitant to give capabilities up or pursue meaningful agreements to stop or limit 
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usage. Some types of cyber tactics are also not universally considered extremely 
dangerous or a major slippery slope. In regard to the Chinese hacks on the U.S., the 
former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper actually respected Chinese 
cyber-espionage and understood why they decided to perpetrate these operations, saying: 
“You have to kind of salute the Chinese for what they did.” Additionally, Clapper wanted 
to make it known that this was not only one-sided and that “if we had the opportunity to 
do the same thing, we’d probably do it”.51 
These types of attacks can also interfere with diplomacy and bilateral or multi-
lateral agreements—which can have international security complications. Constant cyber-
attacks create a continual sense of conflict between the countries which foments an 
adversarial mentality. This is true not only for the leaders, but also extends to citizens of 
the countries attacked as well. Attacks can also affect a state’s sovereignty and human 
security. For example, cyber-attacks on a state’s democratic electoral process clearly 
interferes with state sovereignty and governance, while sabotaging a power grid can 
cause death and other serious societal consequences.  
We know hackers steal people’s identities and infiltrate private emails, … We 
know foreign countries and companies swipe our corporate secrets. Now our 
enemies are also seeking the ability to sabotage our power grid, our financial 
institutions, our air-traffic-control systems. We cannot look back years from now 
and wonder why we did nothing in the face of real threats to our security and our 
economy52 – President Obama 
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Capability is growing and attacks that actually cause physical damage or put people in 
danger have already occurred.  
Internationally, there is currently a major gray area regarding cyber weapons and 
tactics. There is frequent, if not constant, conflict occurring in the cyber realm that has 
mostly stayed below the threshold of escalating to physical violence between states—the 
most public exception to this being the Israeli airstrike on a what its military said was 
“HamasCyberHQ”. In this instance, the military stated that they “thwarted an attempted 
Hamas cyber offensive against Israeli targets” and “targeted a building where the Hamas 
cyber operatives work.”53 Managing escalation is essential, but the location of the exact 
line in the sand (or code) remains in question. The limits on escalation are also clearly 
dependent on the adversary and their respective escalatory capabilities.  
In the past, there has been reported Chinese hacking that targeted energy 
infrastructure and oil.54 How leaders interpret such attacks has profound security 
implications. Attacks that could impact or threaten human security or critical national 
infrastructure could be designated as acts of war and could potentially start a major 
kinetic conflict. Attacks that have negative impacts on national security would be more 
likely to elicit a response, but at what point a victim is willing to escalate depends on a 
vast number of factors. It also would vary from country to country and different leaders 
would likely have different thresholds.  
 










The U.S. itself is suspected to be among the many actors that have used cyber 
capabilities to significantly damage an adversary’s national assets—one example being 
the Stuxnet computer worm attack on Iran. Iranian centrifuges used to refine nuclear 
material were suspected to be damaged by a U.S./Israeli cyber-attack, which significantly 
set back the country’s nuclear program.55 Some of these attacks can potentially be 
executed by sophisticated non-state actors as well—which further complicates the 
creation of clear policies or international laws regarding cyber-attacks. Additionally, the 
difficulty in correctly attributing cyber activities to a specific actor adds a significant 
component of complexity and difficulty in the policy and decision-making process. 
One response tactic to the use of cyber weapons/attacks is to react immediately 
both physically and decisively, which Israel utilized in May of 2019.  
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) … launched a physical attack on Hamas in 
immediate response to an alleged cyber-assault. The IDF hit a building in the 
Gaza Strip with an airstrike after claiming the site had been used by Hamas cyber 
operatives to attack Israel’s cyber space.56  
 
If attribution can be made with high-confidence, this type of response may be effective 
against terrorists or other non-state actors who are in current warzones and are targeting 
critical infrastructure—or other assets that are critical to national security. In such cases, 
maximizing deterrence would involve publicized threats linked to prospective cyber-
targets. If executed successfully, this response could stop active attacks, destroy critical 
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personnel and equipment required to conduct attacks, and also serve as a deterrent for 
future attacks from some other actors. However, this is clearly not an appropriate 
response to non-state actors perpetrating cyber-attacks from within another sovereign 
territory outside of a warzone. Ideally, the other state would be able and willing to assist 
in finding and stopping the threat; however, it is much more difficult in cases where the 
threat is originating from an adversarial nation that might either be supporting the actors 
or have no incentive to stop them. 
It is difficult to react to cyber threats from within other adversarial nations’ 
territory except for increasing cybersecurity defenses—especially if the U.S. itself wants 
to retain the right to use this capability itself whenever it deems necessary. In terms of 
cyber-espionage, exploiting weaknesses is the typical modus operandi and will certainly 
continue to occur. However, agreements and accords can help to make progress in other 
areas. Even if accords are not comprehensive and fall short of effectively prohibiting 
activities in this domain, it will still create a dialogue and understanding between the 
states regarding what is known and allowed in the relationship—which is important for a 
healthy and cooperative relationship. According to Sanger, after Obama announced an 
accord that curbed some of the cyber means of intellectual property theft, there was 
actually a “marked drop-off in that kind of hacking by the Chinese”.57 Therefore, it seems 
some progress can be made, even though cyber-arms control meets heavy resistance by 
states that have already developed advanced capabilities. 
 





It is time the U.S. responds to address the deepening danger of cyber-attacks 
originating from within sovereign states by initiating an ongoing international dialogue 
aimed at establishing norms and guidelines in order to decrease the risks of 
miscalculation. Additionally, the U.S. must increase cyber defenses through coordination 
and sharing of information with its allies. Working with other states by communicating 
when and how attacks occur can increase the ability to defend against these attacks. 
Having technical knowledge of how the perpetrators are attacking can help prepare and 
provide resilience—much like getting a vaccination ahead of time to prepare a body’s 
immune system by building up its defenses to fight off specific types of biologic threats. 
The U.N. Institute for Disarmament and Research has noted the glaring absence of such 
and institutional effort: 
Cyber specialists within regional organizations have themselves identified the 
need to have an opportunity to meet with their peers from other regions in order to 
explore opportunities for inter-organizational cooperation, exchange of 
information and lessons, and potential informal (or more formal) mechanisms for 
collaboration. While they often do so on the margins of other meetings, thus far 
there lacks a structured opportunity in a neutral space for regional organization 
representatives to discuss specific challenges, exchange ideas and share resources. 
No one organization is “mandated” to convene the others and attempts to do so 
thus far have been stymied by politicization by some members.58 
 
Should such an international dialogue be created, it should include creation of an 
international database which catalogs Information and Communication’s Technologies 
(ICT) threats and categorizes them by type of attack and (as much as possible) by 
location. The information would come from public and private sector organizations 
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worldwide after an attack has occurred. This database would be able to be accessed by 
anyone, but the information on the type of vulnerability exploited would be provided by 
the victim of the attack only to trusted partners. According to U.N. General Assembly 
Resolution 73/27 (A/RES/73/27) Section 1.11: 
States should encourage responsible reporting of ICT vulnerabilities and share 
associated information on available remedies for such vulnerabilities to limit and 
possibly eliminate potential threats to ICTs and ICT-dependent infrastructure.59  
 
Thus, this database should be managed by the United Nations, possibly through the Open 
Ended Working Group—which is focusing on developments in the field of information 
and telecommunications in the context of international security. Knowledge of the type of 
vulnerabilities that have been found and exploited can enable members to patch their 
software and reduce/counter these vulnerabilities. 
 While states are likely to share some information formally and informally with 
certain allies and partners, this international database administered by the U.N. would 
provide data that can be utilized for various assessments. It can help create a better threat 
picture and shed some light on a domain that is very esoteric. Illuminating the types of 
threats and attacks, as well as where they originate, may help to determine the degree to 
which certain state and non-state actors are involved and provides the foundation for 
greater cooperation and resilience. It can also lead to legitimate calls to action against 
cyber-aggression from Russia, China, Iran, North Korea, and other state and non-state 
actors. 
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South China Sea 
 
 The South China Sea is a major economic corridor: $3.37 trillion worth of trade 
passed through this sea in 2016 alone. Additionally, 40% of global liquefied natural gas 
trade transited through in 2017. Since 2013, China has created 3,200 acres of new land in 
disputed waters in the Spratly Islands [see appendix]. The South China Sea is also rich in 
mineral resources. It is estimated to hold 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic 
feet of natural gas.60 The building of artificial islands, in an attempt to harden its 
territorial claims and militarize the Spratly Islands, is an attempt to subvert ordinary 
means to resolve territorial disputes and undermine U.S. influence. According to the 2019 
DNI Worldwide Threat Assessment: “China will continue increasing its maritime 
presence in the South China Sea and building military and dual-use infrastructure in the 
Spratly Islands to improve its ability to control access, project power, and undermine US 
influence in the area.”61 Territorial aggression in the South China Sea is one of the 
significant challenges posed by China to the international order. As Patrick Cronin 
characterizes the threat: 
Beyond Asia, the South China Sea is at the nexus of the global economy upon 
which all major trading nations’ prosperity depends. About 90 percent of global 
commercial trade is seaborne, and more than a third of all that trade crosses the 
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South China Sea … where America’s ability to project power in support of 
freedom of the seas is increasingly open to question.62 
 
Cronin correctly argues that the future stability of the region and international order 
(especially at sea) is at stake. It is not the specific rocks, reefs, and resources that are of 
the biggest concern, but instead the bigger picture of the actions being taken by the 
growing revisionist power. In Cronin’s view, the U.S. should not go a single day without 
sailing its vessels through the South China Sea or flying its aircraft over the islands. Doug 
Bandow, however, challenges that approach as provocative and counterproductive: 
For Washington to attempt to coerce the PRC over interests viewed in Beijing as 
important if not vital guarantees a much more confrontational relationship. China 
likely would respond by matching American air and naval maneuvers, 
accelerating military outlays, and challenging U.S. interests elsewhere. Indeed, 
turning today’s regional dispute into a quasi-superpower confrontation would 
raise the stakes and make the issues harder to resolve.63 
 
Bandow argues that the U.S. should withdraw from East Asia, abandon the fight 
for regional hegemony, and withhold security guarantees from threatened states, and take 
no position regarding competing territorial claims. That argument is flawed. China will 
continue to get stronger economically—albeit at a less rapid pace than seen in the recent 
past—and will have the resources and desire to continue to build its military. A U.S. 
departure from the region would leave a vacuum that would almost certainly be filled by 
China. Abandoning allies now would be a disaster politically and militarily, placing vital 
trade routes under Chinese control, and signaling worldwide the likelihood that the U.S. 
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will retreat when a revisionist power challenges the status quo. However, Bandow does 
raise a persuasive challenge to Cronin’s faith in a more robust strategy of deterrence. 
China is becoming stronger and will perceive certain interests, including in the South 
China Sea, as vital to its national security—even if defending those interests entails high 
cost and risk.  
Cronin and Bandow both make important points, but neither complete withdrawal 
nor attempting aggressive and robust military deterrence are viable solutions. Using only 
military strength and maneuvers to coerce and antagonize one another may preserve 
status quo in the short-term but involves an unavoidable risk of miscalculation, while 
deepening the cold war atmosphere characterizing Sino-U.S. relations. To formulate a 
more effective and longer-term South China Sea policy, significant diplomatic efforts 
must be undertaken by both sides. This will include the willingness to compromise and 
find solutions that both sides ultimately can put to paper and agree upon.  
To achieve this goal, the U.S. and key partners will likely have to nudge Chinese 
decisionmakers towards an acceptable solution using a diverse set of capabilities and 
resources. The situation in the SCS must be handled using a more efficient, highly 
coordinated U.S. led multinational effort, which must take a more robust whole-of-
government approach carefully utilizing several different diverse elements of national 
power. The Department of State would lead this effort but would involve many other 
parts of the government including the Department of Defense and other interagency 
partners. This approach must include a strong long-term strategic diplomacy, a carefully 
planned strategic messaging campaign, and economic/trade agreements with allies and 




allies in the region will be essential to presenting a united and determined front opposing 
aggression in the SCS; there is strength in numbers and ultimately this will enable all 
parties involved to keep SCS operations more aligned with the environment in the past—
although all parties must be willing to find a middle ground. This middle ground will be 
hard to negotiate and likely take many rounds of negotiations with the various interested 
parties. 
A temporary understanding will likely need to entail an arrangement somewhat 
similar to the dispute over Taiwan. According to the U.S. Department of State: 
The United States and Taiwan enjoy a robust unofficial relationship. The 1979 U.S.-
P.R.C. Joint Communique switched diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing. In 
the Joint Communique, the United States recognized the Government of the People’s 
Republic of China as the sole legal government of China, acknowledging the Chinese 
position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint 
Communique also stated that the people of the United States will maintain cultural, 
commercial, and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The American 
Institute in Taiwan (AIT) is responsible for implementing U.S. policy toward Taiwan. 
The United States does not support Taiwan independence. Maintaining strong, 
unofficial relations with Taiwan is a major U.S. goal, in line with the U.S. desire to 
further peace and stability in Asia. The 1979 Taiwan Relations Act provides the legal 
basis for the unofficial relationship between the United States and Taiwan, and 
enshrines the U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan in maintaining its defensive 
capability. The United States insists on the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait 
differences, opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, and 




The U.S.-Taiwan relationship should continue to remain with this understanding. 
Although the U.S. does not support Taiwan independence, it has committed to “assist in 
maintaining its defensive capability” and “opposes unilateral changes to the status quo by 
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either side.”65 This wording does not officially commit the United States to defending 
Taiwan militarily, but only assisting in maintaining Taiwan’s capability for defense. 
However, if China were to attempt to make “unilateral changes to the status quo”, this 
wording does not specifically exclude the possibility that the U.S. could actually provide 
some sort of active military defense. If China were to perceive that the U.S. is not 
committed to the defense of Taiwan, then a forceful attempt at reunification may be more 
likely to occur. To preserve the status quo, the U.S. must continue its strong economic 
relations with Taiwan and its significant support for strengthening Taiwan’s defensive 
capacity.  
Politically, keeping open the option of actively engaging in the military defense of 
Taiwan, while not directly stating this publicly, is an appropriate policy but it must be 
supplemented by specific and pointed strategic messaging—including military 
coordination and exercises. In order to deter potential Chinese aggression, it is critical 
that the United States is perceived to be able and willing to defend Taiwan—regardless of 
whether or not the U.S. is actually willing. Until and unless all parties are willing to 
diplomatically negotiate towards more permanent solutions, the U.S. and its allies should 
continue to firmly protect the status quo—both with Taiwan and the South China Sea. 
The best short-term solution involves neither side officially conceding to the other. The 
U.S. should eventually, after returning to a policy of greater inclusion in the region, lead 
the charge in trying to shore up support for a more permanent diplomatic solution. 
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A potential longer-term solution in the South China Sea combines both Cronin 
and Bandow’s arguments. The U.S. completely withdrawing from the region is not in the 
U.S. or its allies’ best interests; however, neither is intensifying the conflict and 
significantly damaging U.S.-Sino relations through attempts to forcibly contain China. As 
China gets stronger, it naturally will fight harder for its important national interests and 
will build the capabilities necessary to achieve its major policy goals—as seen with the 
expansion of its navy. With this understanding, the U.S., its allies, and partners must 
strive to protect their national interests as much as possible and also, to a certain degree, 
allowing China to do the same. What is of greatest importance for the U.S. is protecting 
the vast amount of international trade that transits this sea and sustaining the international 
order. A negotiated agreement must include adequate protections for trade to continue as 
normally as possible, while also ensuring that China feels like it has adequate security 
along its bordering seas. Former China director of the National Security Council, James 
Keith, has stated: “China is fighting back against American dominance as it tries to carve 
out a place for itself in the region.”66 At the same time, other regional states must feel like 
they also have adequate space and security along their borders and in their exclusive 
economic zones. The Nine Dash Line (See Appendix) must be adjusted to provide a more 
workable and reasonable middle ground and, if all sides are open to discussing changes, a 
solution may still be possible.  
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China must be willing to shrink its maritime claims—which have been deemed 
illegal by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hauge, Netherlands with regard to 
international law.67 Peter Dutton, Professor at the U.S. Naval War College and 
Researcher at its U.S.-Asia Law Institute reacted to this ruling: “Over time, this decision 
will inevitably be the basis for resolution of the disputes in the South China Sea. Equally 
inevitable is that a final resolution will be through negotiation between the parties. But I 
believe there will still be a long road ahead.”68 
Making some changes and conceding to some of China’s interests for a broader 
regional security and economic agreement may be in the best interests of many states that 
are involved. Where this line is drawn must be open for discussion by all parties 
involved; at this point, without deep discussions between the states, it is impossible to 
determine exactly where that line may eventually be agreed upon. However, a workable 
agreement certainly requires U.S. leadership, strength, and influence at the table in order 
to counter-balance China and defend the other regional states’ interests. Additionally, 
U.S. partnerships in the region must be as strong as possible in order to present a more 
unified multilateral front against strong Chinese assertiveness in the region. This is 
essential for adequately managing China’s rise over the coming years. 
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Taking on an influential role in the Indo-Pacific is directly aligned with at least 
three of the Trump Administration’s “four pillars” of vital national interest: American 
prosperity, advanced American influence, and promoting peace through strength. 
International relations professor at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Stephen Walt stated, “Trump abandoned the Trans-Pacific Partnership on 
his third day in office, thereby destroying a key institution that would have bound a 
number of Asian countries more tightly to the United States”.69 In place of the TPP, the 
remaining nations signed the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-
Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) with 22 items suspended that the United States wanted 
included.70 The U.S. withdrawal certainly raised questions about U.S. commitment in the 
region. The U.S. must show greater leadership and involvement in the region or China 
will fill the void and U.S. interests will certainly not be protected. The U.S. should 
commit to reentering this agreement and negotiating favorable terms. Additionally, the 
U.S. needs to commit to strengthening existing partnerships and building new ones where 
possible. Furthermore, the U.S. should either provide enhanced alternative means of 
funding for Asian infrastructure or try to influence the Asian Infrastructure Development 
Bank by joining, as other U.S. allies have, and becoming an influential member.  Greater 
U.S. involvement and support in the Indo-Pacific will increase influence and enable the 
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U.S. and partner nations to utilize various types of influence and pressure to achieve more 
favorable outcomes regarding Chinese action in the SCS and in future conflicts. 
Rep. Mac Thornberry, ranking member of the U.S. House Armed Services 
Committee, and other congressmen believe that there is a significant need for legislation 
addressing U.S. commitment, action, and funding in the Indo-Pacific. In April 2020, 
Thornberry released a discussion draft of a potential Indo-Pacific Deterrence Initiative 
and stated: 
Senior officials from both parties, military commanders, and international security 
experts have told us for years that the Indo-Pacific must be this country’s priority 
theater. They are absolutely correct, and it is time to put our money where our 
mouth is. These are not all new programs, but by pulling them together under one 
policy we will be better able to judge our own commitment here at home, 
demonstrate our resolve to our allies and partners, and deter China. We may not 
be able to cover all of these programs this year, but it is important that we make a 
start, and then use this legislation to measure our progress going forward.71 
 
Legislation directing additional funding and increased U.S. involvement in the Indo-
Pacific is an important step towards protecting long-term U.S. interests. 
Additionally, U.S. Senate should ratify the United Nations Convention on the 
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). As Congressman Hank Johnson has argued, “[t]his treaty is 
of paramount importance to American national security interests and our political and 
economic interests in Asia as well. It offers the legitimacy of the rule of law to our 
actions, especially in areas that are contested.”72 This would decrease U.S. hypocrisy with 
 










regard to international rule of law and would provide more legitimacy to the claims of the 
United States, especially with regard to current challenges both in the SCS and in the 
Arctic—where Chinese and Russian presence are rapidly increasing. Admiral Harry 
Harris, former Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, also has voiced his support for 
ratifying UNCLOS. He believes not being a signatory negatively impacts U.S. moral 
standing and has an economic impact, especially in the Arctic.73  
 
PLA Navy Growth and Modernization 
 
Oriana Mastro, Assistant Professor of Security Studies at Georgetown University, 
has argued that China is playing the long game and semi-stealthily becoming a greater 
power.74 She has adequately described the method by which the People’s Republic of 
China (PRC) intends to achieve its major goals.  
China is building a robust, lethal force with capabilities spanning the air, 
maritime, space and information domains which will enable China to impose its 
will in the region. As it continues to grow in strength and confidence, our nation’s 
leaders will face a China insistent on having a greater voice in global interactions, 
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Understanding the modernization of forces is critical when forming policy and the U.S. 
must be proactive in ensuring that the outcome is as favorable to U.S. interests as 
possible. The Rand Corporation did a comparative study of the U.S. and Chinese 
militaries and has determined: 
Over the past two decades, China's People's Liberation Army has transformed 
itself from a large but antiquated force into a capable, modern military. Although 
China continues to lag the United States in terms of aggregate military hardware 
and operational skills, it has improved its relative capabilities in many critical 
areas … China’s improved performance could raise costs, lengthen [an Indo-
Pacific] conflict, and increase risks to the United States.76 
 
Economically, China’s GDP growth has been significantly higher than the United 
States over the past few decades.77 “The gap between the size of the two economies in 
terms of nominal GDP is expected to lessen by 2023; the U.S. economy is projected to 
grow to $24.88 trillion by 2023, followed closely by China at $19.41 trillion.”78 Below is 
a chart from the World Bank comparing the two nation’s GDP growth as a percent: 
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“China’s double-digit economic growth has slowed recently, but it served to fund 
several successive defense modernization Five-Year Plans”.79 China has “built more than 
one hundred warships in the past decade, a build rate outstripping the mighty U.S. 
Navy” and is believed to be building several aircraft carriers.80 The Peoples Liberation 
Army and its Naval branch (PLAN) are growing and modernizing at a rapid pace—
especially with regard to its aircraft carrier program.  
Five years after commissioning its first aircraft carrier, the Liaoning, China 
launched its second carrier – the Type 001A – on April 26, 2017. Unlike its 
Soviet-built predecessor, the Type 001A is China’s first domestically built carrier. 
Both carriers are similar in size and use a STOBAR (Short Take-Off But Arrested 
Recovery) system for the launch and recovery of aircraft. Although similar to 
the Liaoning, the Type 001A features some notable enhancements and represents 
an important step in China’s developing aircraft carrier program.81 
 
The Type 001A is suspected of being the first of three planned domestic aircraft 
carrier models. Enhancements are expected include an increase in airwing size, and faster 
cruising speed. Some key vulnerabilities include the use of a ski jump, instead of a launch 
system, which requires a speed of around 20 knots to launch fixed wing aircraft. It is also 
conventionally powered, instead of nuclear. “Beijing probably also will use the carrier to 
project power throughout the South China Sea and possibly into the Indian Ocean. The 
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carrier conducted initial sea trials in May 2018 and is expected to enter into service by 
2019”.82 
Although the Type 001A is vastly inferior to the American Nimitz and Ford class 
carriers, the plans for a Type 002 and Type 003 are of great significance. Both the Type 
002 and 003 have already begun construction. The Type 003 is expected to include the 
addition of an electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)—currently the most 
advanced aircraft launch system—and nuclear power. If the Type 003 has these features, 
it will have capabilities similar to the USS Gerald R. Ford—which was commissioned in 
2017 as the newest and most advanced U.S. naval carrier. Both the rapid progress of this 
carrier program and the massive amount of resources devoted to it are evidence of 
Beijing’s intent to become a larger player globally. These carriers will change the 
operational environment in the near future, create novel challenges in the region, and 
must be considered when developing short, mid, and long-term strategies regarding 
China.  
That expansion in Chinese naval power would alone make it vital to prioritize a 
diplomatic approach to managing the changing geopolitical relationship. China’s leverage 
is going to increase as its economy and military continues to grow. Thus, it is in the best 
interests of the United States to create a deeper and more effective Sino-American 
dialogue now. This includes negotiating legal agreements before China gets even more 
leverage. With adequate U.S. influence and pressure in the region, there may be a 
 






possibility for some small agreements regarding arms control and dialogue across 
multiple domains of great concern and rapid development—including outer space and 
cyber. Cooperation and dialogue would be in U.S. and neighboring states’ best interests. 
China’s growth and goals require some adjustments in the status quo. Outside of the 
general challenge to the status quo of the international order, some specific Chinese 
actions are only moderately concerning and are strikingly similar to historical and current 
paths taken by great Western powers.  
China’s economic growth and desire to play a more active role in the region has 
already changed the geopolitical calculus. Some argue that a policy of containment is the 
proper reaction, but this policy lacks situational awareness and is nearsighted. It is true 
that the PLA Navy will not achieve complete parity with the U.S. Navy any time soon; 
however, in a few short years China is expected to achieve technological parity with U.S. 
Aircraft Carriers and has already developed a fifth-generation fighter—the J-20. A small, 
but similarly capable, naval fleet in the Indo-Pacific region will substantially change the 
geopolitical situation and power dynamics. Since the U.S. and other powers are unwilling 
to go to war with China, by preemptively destroying these already partially built carriers, 
the U.S. must consider some foreign policy adaptations.  
As China continues to become a greater power, the key to achieving long-term 
peace in Sino-American relations is accepting that Beijing play a larger and more 
responsible role on terms seen as acceptable and reasonable by the U.S. and its allies. 
This includes insisting that it become a responsible part of the world order that already 
exists. It also includes that other countries make reasonable changes that are necessary to 




feels as though it has sovereignty and security. The U.S. should focus its efforts less on 
fighting China at every point possible and more on setting up an environment favorable 
to the U.S, while strategically picking its battles. Regarding the South China Sea, 
negotiations will have concessions on all sides and ultimately create an agreement on 
which regional actors can agree. However, this does not mean give up or be soft on 
China. China must and will understand that the U.S. will secure its interests abroad and 
will defend the freedom of the seas.  
Additionally, it is essential that key allies like the Philippines, Taiwan, and others 
in the region take on a larger role in their defense. The U.S. can and should support these 
allies, but China must perceive these countries as capable and willing to defend 
themselves at all costs—instead of perceiving the conflict as being directly with the 
United States. A focus on ensuring and promoting international support is also essential. 
Support from the international community will ensure the strength of the international 
order and create buy-in from other countries. This is also true for recommended actions 
within the U.S. and through international organizations regarding cyber threats. There are 
some key issues that both countries will perceive as vital and not easily find compromise 
on, but the conversations must be had with open minds and dedication.  
Stated in the unclassified summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, in part 
“the willingness of rivals to abandon aggression will depend on their perception of U.S. 
strength and the vitality of our alliances and partnerships”.83 Thus, the U.S. must continue 
 






to modernize and build its military capabilities, strengthen international support and 
alliances—especially with India—and continue to create mutually beneficial economic 
partnerships. The U.S. must also be willing to make some concessions in areas that are 
more vital to Chinese national security than U.S. national security.  
The amount and type of resources the PRC has dedicated to its military and cyber 
capacities have made its intentions clear; one way or another China will play a larger role 
in its region and beyond. This is why creating an environment where China acts more like 
a partner in the security of the region, instead of an adversary, is absolutely critical. Not 
only is this shift essential to avoid increased tension and danger, but also can prove to be 
mutually beneficial. However, work towards this shift needs to begin now. The ability of 
both sides to view the relationship as more of a partnership is temporally bounded and 
becomes less likely every day. The stronger the Chinese military and economy get the 
less Beijing will be willing to negotiate. Additionally, if the countries wait too long to try 
to accomplish this shift, there likely will be a point of no return and the Sino-U.S. 
relationship will be so steeped in past transgressions and conflict that a shift in the 
relationship will become even more difficult, if not impossible. 
 
A Long-term Strategy 
 
China will continue to gain economic, military, and political strength in the Indo-
Pacific and abroad. A policy based solely on containment will be counterproductive and 
fail. Instead, the United States should adopt a policy of rise management as the strategic, 




challenges presented by China’s rise. Militarily, the U.S. must continue investing and 
developing to maintain a strong credible deterrent and as much relative strength as 
possible; this will also maintain a strong position for negotiations. Additionally, the U.S. 
must be a unifying force and an enable partners and allies to strengthen partnerships and 
increase defenses to deter aggressive Chinese action.  
In the cyber domain, the U.S. must increase defenses and work with the 
international community to increase capabilities for attribution. The U.S. should clearly 
convey to Beijing and other actors where it considers cyber-attacks to be escalatory in 
nature, in order to effectively deter some types of attacks. Economically, the U.S. should 
be creating and maintaining strong trade and economic partnerships/agreements in the 
Indo-Pacific. Furthermore, the U.S. should be providing incentives for Beijing to be more 
involved in current multinational institutions, which may include allowing for Beijing to 
have greater influence in some decision-making processes. If the U.S. utilizes this policy, 
managing China’s rise will provide the best chance of achieving a long-term peaceful and 








The Way Forward 
 
In this globalized and rapidly advancing technological world, the national 
interests of one state are increasingly overlapping with other states’ interests. 
Globalization and the rapid advancement of technology has changed the utility of force in 
the 21st century. The utility of force has evolved, resulting in a shift in the character of 
war. This shift entails an increased focus on methods of force mainly below the threshold 
of traditional armed great power conflict. Furthermore, the actions of one sovereign 
nation are increasingly likely to impact other sovereign nations. This holds true in many 
areas, even between states that have different political systems and ideologies. 
Technology has made the world smaller and significantly increased the ability of actors 
to cause significant global effects. This is one significant reason why NORAD & 
USNORTHCOM Commander General O’Shaughnessy states that the “homeland is no 
longer a sanctuary”84 and described the situation while testifying before the U.S. Senate 
Armed Services Committee on 13 February 2020: 
In the years following the Cold War, our nation enjoyed the benefits of military 
dominance as well as geographic barriers that kept our homeland beyond the 
reach of most conventional threats… Eroding military advantage is undermining 
our ability to detect threats, defeat attacks, and therefore deter aggression against 
the homeland… The threats facing our nations are real and significant. The Arctic 
 
84 Rempfer, K. (2018, August 27). 'The homeland is no longer a sanctuary' amid rising near-peer threats, 







is no longer a fortress wall, and our oceans are no longer protective moats; they 
are now avenues of approach for advanced conventional weapons and the 
platforms that carry them. Our adversaries’ capability to directly attack the 
homeland has leapt forward…85  
 
The rapid advance of technology will continue, and new developments of offensive 
weapons will occur much faster than effective defenses. This demands new strategies and 
policies, if the U.S. led international order is to thrive. Avoiding severe consequences 
requires a greater willingness for global cooperation, even between nations and political 
systems that are vastly different from each other. However, when faced with overtly 
aggressive actors like Russia, where tensions are already extremely high, the building of 
defenses as rapidly as possible is critical for defense and deterrence. At the same time, 
diplomacy, dialogue, and a willingness to respond with strength is essential. The U.S. 
response to Russian aggression requires more traditional strength through deterrence and 
strategic messaging, but dialogue and cooperation is still incredibly important for the 
future of more positive U.S.-Russian relations. 
In the cyber domain, the U.S. must increase defenses and work with the 
international community to increase capabilities for attribution. The U.S. should clearly 
convey to Beijing, Russia, and other cyber-actors where it considers cyber-attacks to be 
escalatory in nature, in order to effectively deter. At the same time, innovating and 
building systems to counter new technological threats is essential. Additionally, the U.S. 
must build deeper public-private partnerships and enact legislation to increase the 
protection for the electoral system.   
 





China’s long-term realist strategy is smart and likely to succeed—barring major 
events the dramatically shift the geopolitical landscape. It is in the United States best 
interest to plan for continued Chinese economic growth and influence both regionally and 
globally. At this point in time, it would be counterproductive, at best, to try to take a 
hardline containment strategy against China. Instead, the United States can and should 
take action to create the conditions necessary for Beijing to benefit from becoming a 
more productive member of the current international order. It is clear that the Communist 
Party of China does not believe in democracy or freedom. These strong shared values 
have brought democracies together for decades, but these values will not incentivize 
China to join the U.S. led liberal order. Instead, Beijing must believe there is actual 
benefit from being a productive member. Thus, diplomacy and negotiation in terms of 
economics and power structures will prove of the utmost value. It is essential that the 
U.S. and other nations be willing to offer actual economic benefits and, in some areas, 
more authority and responsibility. 
The U.S. and its partners must provide incentives and create the necessary 
conditions for a favorable outcome, but China must ultimately make the decision to take 
this path forward. In the long-run, small sacrifices today will bring much greater benefits 
tomorrow. The alternative policy option of using only the stick—attempting to contain 
China by all means possible—would bring short-term benefits at the cost of long-term 
disaster. If the Chinese make the wrong choice and threaten the international order that 
has defended peace and prosperity for decades, then the U.S., its allies, and partner 
nations must be willing and able to resolutely defeat any and all future threats that may 




 The U.S. needs to prioritize efforts to strengthen its economic, political, and 
military partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. The U.S. must be more involved in economic 
agreements in the region and place an emphasis on strategic messaging. Until more 
permanent diplomatic measures are agreed upon, the U.S. must strongly defend the status 
quo in the SCS and with Taiwan. Additionally, Congress should work towards an Indo-
Pacific Deterrence Initiative and the U.S. Senate should ratify the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Ratifying UNCLOS will further 
legitimize U.S. actions in the SCS and the Arctic and decrease perceived U.S. hypocrisy 
with regard to international rule of law. 
The United States must also be keenly aware of growing Sino-Russian relations. 
Richard Weitz, senior fellow and director of the Center for Political Military analysis at 
the Hudson Institute, has stated that military ties between these two nations have been 
growing and: 
“Sino-Russian security cooperation presents challenges to U.S. interests, 
including to the regional security balance, U.S.-led sanctions, and U.S. military 
freedom of action and access. These challenges would grow if China and Russia 
were to form a full-fledged defense alliance.”86 
 
Weitz says that China and Russia have some mutual interests, especially when it comes 
to countering the United States and undermining U.S. bilateral and multilateral alliances. 
He believes that the military ties are set to deepen, which can prove very problematic for 
 
86 Ellyatt, H. (2019, September 30). Are Russia and China the best of friends now? It's complicated, 






the United States.87 If Weitz is correct, the U.S. will need to counter an increase in Sino-
U.S. military relations as much as possible and will also need to evaluate what 
consequence specific actions in the region may have on these relations before taking 
them. 
Globalization, rapid technological advances, and the change in the character of 
warfare demands new strategies and policies. If the U.S. led international order is to 
thrive, U.S. policy and strategy must prepare farther into the future than just one four- or 
eight-year presidential administration. If the United States is to compete effectively with 
other strategic competitors, longer-term interests need to be of greater importance than 
short. The U.S. strategy must utilize a whole of government approach to adapt to the 
modern complex threat environment and keep partisan and policy disputes within 
manageable limits. Global partnerships must be a priority—and it is essential for the U.S. 
to be adaptable and dynamic if it is to remain a global leader. 
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Afterword: The COVID-19 Pandemic 
 
As this thesis was being finalized, the COVID-19 virus spread across the globe 
causing the World Health Organization to declare a pandemic.88 The effects of COVID-
19 are expected to be far reaching, although the full impact at this point cannot be known. 
The global economy will be significantly impacted, at least in the short-term, and the full 
effects of COVID-19 are yet to be seen as it relates to international relations and 
geopolitics. “SARS-CoV-2, the virus that causes COVID-19, is thought to have first 
jumped from an animal host to humans in Wuhan, China”89 and the full impact this 
virus will have on the people of China and the Communist Party has also yet to be seen. 
In March 2020, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China 
announced that it would be kicking out U.S. journalists during the pandemic.90 China 
claimed that this was in reaction to restrictive measures on journalists from China, but 
removing foreign journalists makes it easier to restrict reporting on the impacts and 
response to COVID-19 within China. During this critical time and as the situation 
 
88 Ducharme, J. (2020, March 11). The WHO Just Declared Coronavirus COVID-19 a Pandemic. 
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progresses, the manner in which China-U.S. relations are conducted will likely have an 
effect on how the foreign policies of both nations evolve. Additionally, there has been a 
significant drop in oil demand as various types of global stay-at-home orders have been 
implemented—which will significantly impact Russia, at least in the short-term. 
The tragic and deadly COVID-19 pandemic has raised some questions which 
have yet to be fully answered, especially how it started and what China could or should 
have done to contain the virus early. Hopefully, the world can learn from this and better 
prepare for potential future pandemics. Whatever the full impacts may be in China, 
Russia, and the United States, the consequences of COVID-19 provide additional mutual 
incentive to try to deepen international dialogue and cooperation in this globalized world, 
where decisions across the globe can have severe global impacts at home—making 
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